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 I. INTRODUCTION
 Fringe benefits have been increasing steadily as a percentage of total
 labor compensation in the U.S. since the 1940s, with the increase being
 particularly rapid during the past twenty years [9, 11, 20] . Research efforts
 to explain this phenomenon, however, have been limited. Rice discusses four
 factors thought to be important in explaining the incidence and growth of
 fringe benefits: (1) rising incomes, in combination with the preferential tax
 treatment of benefits vis-a-vis cash wages; (2) the savings associated with
 the group purchase of benefits; (3) the extent of unionization; and (4)
 efforts to reduce labor turnover in the face of rising turnover costs [14] .
 Subsequent research has been devoted largely to modeling and testing
 empirically hypothesized relationships between the above factors and the
 share of fringe benefits in total compensation. Freeman emphasizes the role
 of unions [4] , while Long and Scott focus attention on the preferential tax
 treatment of fringe benefits [11]. In a different approach, Woodbury uses
 the translog indirect utility function to estimate that both the income elas-
 ticity of demand for fringes and the elasticity of substitution between wages
 and fringes exceed unity [ 20] . The various studies utilize different data and
 different variables and, as may be expected, do not always produce consis-
 tent results. On balance, however, they tend to support RiceTs original
 hypotheses.
 In a recent paper, Alpert adds a new dimension to this line of inquiry,
 suggesting that product market power (proxied by the four firm concentra-
 ♦The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of
 anonymous referees.
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 tion ratio) also may play a role in explaining the fringe share and presenting
 empirical results which support this view [2, 1]. These findings have a
 number of interesting implications for research and public policy. For one
 thing, numerous empirical studies have estimated the effects of concentra-
 tion on wages, but ignore fringe benefits. If concentration affects fringes to
 a relatively greater extent than it affects wages, as Alpertfs findings imply,
 the effect of market power on total compensation has been understated in
 such studies. Furthermore, an additional source of inefficiency would be
 associated with the distortion of the wage fringe mix itself. Finally, since
 the bulk of fringe benefits are given favorable tax treatment, Alpertfs find-
 ings suggest that market power promotes a form of tax avoidance, raising
 concerns about the efficiency and equity of our tax system.
 There are, however, several reasons for regarding Alpertfs results as
 tentative. First, his data on concentration, fringe benefits, and other vari-
 ables come from different sources and are compiled in different ways,
 raising possible concerns about data comparability. Second, his concentra-
 tion variable is aggregated to the SIC three digit major industry level,
 whereas the narrower four digit industry generally is considered to be the
 most appropriate level of aggregation for measuring concentration and
 market power [15]. Finally, Alpert follows the common practice of using
 unadjusted Census concentration data, although it is widely recognized that
 these data are subject to errors because (1) the SIC industry classifications
 do not correspond always to meaningful economic markets and (2) the
 compilation of these data on a national basis does not reflect always the
 geographic scope of the market. Thus, additional tests clearly are war-
 ranted.
 This paper provides further empirical evidence on the effects of mar-
 ket power on the fringe benefit share in total compensation. In light of the
 potential problems mentioned above, Bureau of the Census four digit data
 are used for all but one of the included variables and adjusted concentration
 data are used in the multiple regression analysis of the fringe share. The
 results provide important corroboration at the individual industry level for
 some of the earlier findings, including Alpert's findings with respect to
 concentration.
 The next section briefly reviews the principal theoretical determinants
 of the fringe share as developed in previous research. In addition to concen-
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 tration, these include income, group size, the extent of unionization, and
 efforts to reduce labor turnover in the face of rising turnover costs.
 IL DETERMINANTS OF THE WAGE FRINGE MIX
 Rising incomes may lead to the growth of fringe benefits for two
 distinct reasons. First, if fringe benefits are normal goods and if they also
 have an income elasticity exceeding unity (as seems reasonable), the share of
 total compensation taken in the form of fringe benefits will rise with
 income. Second, the rising marginal tax rates on increased cash earnings
 embodied in the progressive tax structure produce a gradual reduction as
 earnings rise in the effective price of fringe benefits; they are typically
 either untaxed (e.g., group health and life insurance premiums) or taxed only
 on a deferred basis (e.g., pension contributions). This price effect should
 result in a substitution of fringes for cash wages, thereby also increasing the
 share of fringe benefits in total compensation.
 The differential between the individual price and the group price for
 many benefits also should encourage the growth of fringe benefits. As Rice
 observes [ 14] , group prices tend to vary inversely with the size of the group
 for which the purchase is made, suggesting that the effect of this price
 differential may be captured empirically by a variable related to size.
 Freeman provides several possible rationales for a positive impact of
 unions on fringe benefit growth [4] . Stressing the political nature of unions,
 he uses a median voter model in which the union represents the tastes of the
 median rather than the marginal worker. Given that the median worker
 likely is older and less mobile than the marginal worker, he/she presumably
 has a greater demand for fringes. Freeman also notes that union wage
 effects tend to result in increased job tenure and lower quit rates, which
 increase the likelihood that workers actually will receive deferred fringes
 such as nonvested pensions and life insurance benefits. This would tend to
 increase the value of such benefits to union members. Finally, Freeman
 stresses the role of the union as a credible source of information for employ-
 1For further discussion, see [11, 20]. In their empirical work, Long
 and Scott and Woodbury find the price effect more important than the
 income effect. Alpert [2] , however, reaches the opposite conclusion.
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 ees concerning benefits and as a transmitter of accurate information on
 employee preferences to the employer.2
 An alternative and purely economic analysis of the role of unions is
 provided by Mincer [12] , who argues that unions push for a greater fringe
 share as a way of protecting members from one of the adverse consequences
 of demanding higher wages. According to Mincer, the well documented
 tendency for unionized workers to obtain higher wages could be expected to
 cause employers to reduce hours, thus limiting any gain in weekly earnings
 arising from the increased wages. To blunt this response, unions attempt to
 increase quasi-fixed costs, such as fringes, more rapidly than wages. Higher
 fixed costs encourage employers to respond to rising wages with layoffs
 rather than with reduced hours. Layoffs, Mincer says, are preferred by
 unions because they imply a smaller loss of income than reduced hours, given
 the existence of unemployment compensation and other unemployment
 benefits.
 It also has been generally recognized that deferred fringe benefits (and
 other benefits that increase with tenure) may be used by employers as a
 device for strengthening the attachment of employees to the firm, thereby
 reducing turnover. As on the job training costs have increased, the costs of
 turnover correspondingly have risen. Fringe benefits that tie workers to the
 firm are a way of reducing such costs, and industries which have greater
 investments in specific human capital reasonably may be expected to have
 greater fringe shares.3
 The possibility that product market power also may affect the fringe
 share had not been considered prior to AlpertTs paper. Considerable research
 has been devoted to the question, however, of whether product market power
 affects hourly wage rates.4 Long and Linkfs recent findings show a positive
 impact of product market power on annual fringe benefits [10] . Therefore,
 2Lester [9] has uncovered data suggesting that employers tend to
 underestimate the value placed on benefits by their employees.
 3Some recent research suggests that fringe benefits, particularly
 pension and health insurance plans, can be effective in discouraging
 turnover. See [13].
 4The results have been mixed. See [18, 6, 3, 7] .
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 it is reasonable to look for a possible impact of product market power on the
 fringe benefit share.
 Alpert offers a variety of intuitive explanations why product market
 power may affect the fringe share. He cites the Weiss argument that firms
 in concentrated industries may pay higher wage rates "to buy public favor
 and/or to limit union power" [18, p. 97] . He then states [2, pp. 183-184] :
 If supplements are superior to money wages at
 attaining these objectives, firms possessing mar-
 ket power may pay larger proportions of supple-
 ments, compensation constant, than firms without
 market power. Another complementary rationale
 for higher proportions of supplements being paid
 by firms possessing market power is that such
 firms may be relatively strong bargaining oppo-
 nents, and hence they may act independently to
 alter the composition of compensation so that
 remuneration of a given market value to the
 worker is less costly to the firm. Such a package
 would contain a relatively large proportion of
 wage supplements.
 Although these explanations are speculative, they are buttressed by
 Alpert's arguments for interaction between product market power and
 unionization [2] . Market power and unionization may interact positively to
 increase the proportion of fringe benefits in total compensation for either
 of two reasons. First, both unions and firms may attempt to increase the
 proportion of fringe benefits in the compensation package because the
 market value of such a package will be higher. (This may be due to the
 favorable tax treatment of fringe benefits.) Alternatively, the presence of
 product market power may enhance the unioiVs ability to increase the
 fringe share because firms in concentrated industries may be less resistant
 to the demands of unions. This is because such firms tend to be more
 profitable and also better able to pass on cost increases to their customers
 than other firms. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the union
 effect on the fringe share will be stronger in high concentration industries.
 A variety of other factors have been recognized as potentially signif-
 icant in explaining the incidence and growth of fringe benefits. For
 example, various demographic characteristics of workers, such as age
 distribution, sex, marital status, and number of dependents also may be
 important. The four factors identified by Rice, however, have dominated
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 subsequent research and discussion. Therefore, attention will be focused on
 these factors and on market concentration in the empirical tests below.
 IIL THE DATA AND VARIABLES
 The principal sources of data are the Annual Survey of Manufactures
 and the Census of Manufacturers [16, 17] , which provide data by four digit
 industry on total labor costs (TLC). Total labor costs are broken down into
 the following three components: (1) Payroll (PAY), or the total wages and
 salaries paid; (2) Legally mandated fringe benefits (LMB), consisting pri-
 marily of employer contributions for social security, unemployment com-
 pensation, and workmanTs compensation; and (3) Nonmandated fringe
 benefits (NMB), those benefits paid for voluntarily by employers. Most
 other data used in this study are derived from these same sources.
 Table 1 shows aggregate data on fringe benefit trends for the entire
 U.S. manufacturing sector. Part A shows the three way breakdown of total
 labor costs as described above for 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1981. Part B
 shows the two way breakdown of total voluntary labor costs between pay-
 roll and nonmandated benefits for the same years. From these figures, it is
 clear that the shares of both legally mandated and nonmandated benefits in
 total labor costs have increased significantly over the period 1967-1981,
 with the latter share nearly doubling.
 The dependent variable FRINGE, which is calculated for both 1967
 and 1977, is defined as NMB/(NMB + PAY), where NMB is nonmandated
 benefits and PAY is payroll. The independent variables employed in this
 study are defined as follows:
 (1) COMP is the level of average annual compensation in the industry,
 computed by dividing the sum of payroll (PAY) and nonmandated fringe
 benefits (NMB) for the industry by total industry employment. This vari-
 able is specific to the years 1967 or 1977, as appropriate. As in several
 prior studies, this single variable is used to capture both the real income
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 TABLE 1
 Distribution of Total Labor Costs in U.S. Manufacturing
 Percent of Total Labor Costs
 1967 1972 1977 1981
 Payroll 89.0 86.7 82.9 81.6
 Legally Mandated
 Benefits 4.7 5.2 6.6 7.2
 Nonmandated
 Benefits 6.3 8.1 10.5 11.2
 Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Percent of Voluntary Labor Costs
 1967 1972 1977 1981
 Payroll 93.3 91.5 88.8 87.9
 Nonmandated
 Benefits 6.7 8.5 11.2 12.1
 Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Source: data in Annual Survey of Manufactures, 1968, 1974, and 1981 and
 Census of Manufactures 1977
 effect of rising income and the substitution effect of the declining effec-
 tive price of fringe benefits resulting from the progressive tax structure.
 (2) SIZE is the fraction of the industry's total employment which was
 employed in establishments with 500 or more workers, again specific to
 1967 or 1977 as appropriate [17] . Consistent with prior studies, this vari-
 able serves as a proxy for the savings possible from the group purchase of
 5There are several difficulties in attempting to separate the tax effect
 from the income effect in studies of this kind. Alpert uses as a separate
 variable the federal marginal tax rate which would apply to a worker who
 receives the industryTs average annual earnings and who uses the standard
 deduction while claiming the average number of exemptions. Sources of
 measurement error include: 1. use of an average income figure, which may
 hide considerable variation in income and marginal tax rates among an
 industry's workers; 2. failure to take into account state income taxes,
 which vary widely; 3. failure to take into account other household income,
 including spouses' income, which can vary considerably among industries and
 will affect the marginal tax rates. Alpert recognizes that measurement
 problems may explain why he did not find a sizable tax effect.
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 benefits. This measure seems preferable to a measure of the average size
 of establishments, which may be unduly sensitive to the presence of numer-
 ous small establishments in some industries.
 (3) KLRATIO is the capital labor ratio, more specifically the ratio of
 gross assets to employment for either 1967 or 1977. Following Long and
 Scott, this measure serves as a proxy for potential turnover costs, since
 more capital intensive industries are presumed to require a more highly
 trained work force.
 (4) UNION, for 1967, is the fraction of the industry!s employees
 covered by collective bargaining agreements, from Freeman and Medoff
 [5], These data relate to 1968-1972 and are available only on the three
 digit level of aggregation. Therefore, each four digit industry in the
 sample takes the value of the three digit industry group of which it is a
 part. Since comparable data on unionization are not available for 1967 and
 1977, it is necessary to use a different, albeit similar, measure for 1977.
 For 1977, UNION is the fraction of the industry's employees who belonged
 to unions averaged over the three years 1976-1978, from Kokkelenberg and
 Sockell [8] . These data also are available at roughly the three digit level.
 UNION is the only variable employed for which the data are not matched to
 a Census four digit code. Consistent with previous studies, the union
 fraction serves as a proxy for union power.
 (5) CONC is the adjusted Census four firm concentration ratio,
 defined as the proportion of total industry shipments accounted for by the
 four largest sellers. Although the Census concentration ratio is the most
 frequently used measure of product market power in empirical work, its
 shortcomings are well known [ 15] . These problems may be reduced, ho w-
 6 [11]. Capital intensity is probably not an ideal proxy for turnover
 costs, but it seems the best alternative available.
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 ever, by using adjusted figures from Weiss and Pascoe' which correct for
 improper product market boundaries for the presence of regional and local
 markets and for foreign trade. The concentration data originate in the
 same source and are compiled on the same consistent four digit basis as are
 all other data used in this study except the unionization data, thus ensuring
 a high degree of comparability.
 (6) INTER is an interaction term, the product of UNION and CONC.
 The inclusion of an interaction term is consistent with earlier discussion
 and will facilitate comparisons with Alpert.
 The sample consists of all four digit manufacturing industries for
 which the requisite data were available, except for those industries with
 "miscellaneous" or "not elsewhere classified" in their titles. For 1967, the
 sample consists of 208 industries. For 1977, the sample is reduced to 177
 industries, primarily because data for the SIZE variable were lacking for a
 number of industries included in the 1967 sample. For purposes of compar-
 ison, results with this smaller sample will be presented for both 1967 and
 1977.
 IV. THE REGRESSION RESULTO
 Equation 2-1 in Table 2 shows the results for 1967 for the 208 indus-
 try sample. The coefficient of determination (R2, adjusted for degrees of
 freedom) indicates that approximately two-thirds of the interindustry
 variation in the fringe share is explained by independent variables. The
 coefficients on COMP, SIZE, and KLRATIO all have the expected signs and
 are highly significant. The coefficients on CONC and UNION are negative,
 but are not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on INTER is
 positive and statistically significant. As is evidently the case in Álpert's
 7See [19]. The Weiss Pascoe data are for 1972. The 1967 CONC
 variable is the Weiss Pascoe measure multiplied by the ratio of the 1967 and
 1972 official Census concentration ratios. The 1977 CONC variable is the
 Weiss Pascoe measure multiplied by the ratio of the 1977 and 1972 official
 Census concentration ratios. This procedure assumes that the appropriate
 adjustments for 1967 and 1977 are proportional to the 1972 adjustment.
 Given the high degree of stability of the official concentration ratios from
 one Census year to another, this seems reasonable. For the sample, the
 simple correlation between the 1967 and 1972 Census concentration ratios is
 +0.96. The 1972-1977 correlation is +0.92.
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 TABLE 2
 Regression Equations Explaining the Fringe Share
 1967 and 1977
 Equation (2-1) (2-2) (2-3)
 Year 1967 1967 1977
 Industries 208 177 177
 Intercept 0.00316 0.00081 0.00211
 (0.57) (0.14) (0.24)
 COMP 0.00508** 0.00564** 0.00442**
 (7.92) (7.98) (8.65)
 SIZE 0.02200** 0.02029** 0.02596**
 (6.86) (5.50) (4.59)
 KLRATIO 0.00013** 0.00006 -0.00003
 (2.36) (0.98) (-0.57)
 UNION -0.00092 -0.00029 0.02821
 (-0.09) (-0.03) (1.32)
 CONC -0.00201 -0.00117 0.02429
 (-0.18) (-0.10) (1.33)
 INTER 0.05031* 0.04842* 0.04164
 (2.28) (2.02) (0.89)
 R2 0.66 0.66 0.73
 F-ratio 67.06 56.69 78.58
 t-values in parentheses
 »statistically significant at .95 level of confidence
 »♦statistically significant at .99 level of confidence
 study also, the separate effects of UNION, CONC and INTER in equation 2-
 1 may be obscured by multicollinearity. For 1967, the simple correlations
 between UNION and INTER and between CONC and INTER are +0.67 and
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 Q
 +0.76, respectively. Overall, however, the regression results clearly
 suggest that product market power and unionization interact positively to
 raise the fringe share.
 Equation 2-2 in Table 2 also shows results for 1967, but for the
 smaller 1977 sample. The results are similar to those portrayed in equation
 2-1, except KLRATIO ceases to be statistically significant. The perform-
 ance of KLRATIO in the regression equation is sensitive to the exact
 composition of the sample.
 The results for 1977 are shown in equation 2-3. The overall level of
 explanation is even higher than that obtained for 1967, with the adjusted
 R2 climbing to 0.73. In general, the coefficients of determination in the
 study compare favorably with the maximum R2 obtained by Alpert of 0.43
 [2]. This improvement can be attributed primarily to measurement of the
 different variables on a consistent and comparable basis at the appropriate
 level of aggregation.9 For 1977, the coefficients on COMP and SIZE con-
 tinue to be positive and highly significant, while KLRATIO is again insignif-
 icant for this sample. The UNION, CONC, and INTER variables show
 positive, but statistically insignificant, coefficients. The fact that all
 three variables are insignificant, however, appears to be due to multicol-
 linearity. The quantitative impact of concentration and unionization on the
 fringe share is similar in 1967 and 1977, with these variables jointly pro-
 ducing a strong positive effect both years.
 Although all of the independent variables, with the possible exception
 of KLRATIO, appear to explain partially the share of fringe benefits in
 Q
 °Other correlations among the independent variables may also be of
 interest. The simple correlation matrix for the 208 industry sample is:
 FRINGE 1.00
 COMP 0.66 1.00
 SIZE 0.58 0.38 1.00
 KLRATIO 0.36 0.34 0.06 1.00
 UNION 0.34 0.20 0.06 0.28 1.00
 CONC 0.55 0.40 0.43 0.22 0.12 1.00
 INTER 0.61 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.67 0.76 1.00
 FRINGE COMP SIZE KLRATIO UNION CONC INTER
 While simple correlations are not decisive, these figures do not suggest any
 other serious problems with multicollinearity.
 Experiments with the official Census concentration ratios suggest
 that the use of adjusted ratios is not a major source of the improvement.
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 total compensation, it is important also to consider the quantitative magni-
 tudes of their effects. The coefficients on COMP are fairly stable across
 the three equations in Table 2 and indicate that this variable has a sizable
 effect, with each $1000 increase in income raising the fringe share by
 roughly one-half a percentage point. Using equation 2-1 to illustrate, an
 increase in COMP from its approximate 1967 mean value of $7000 to
 $8000, with all other variables held constant at their means, would result in
 an approximate increase in the fringe share from .058 to .063.
 For SIZE, the coefficients are also relatively stable and indicate that
 each ten percentage point rise in the proportion of an industryTs employees
 who are employed in large plants leads to an increase in the fringe share of
 roughly two-tenths of a percentage point. At the extreme, an industry with
 nothing but large plants would have a fringe share more than two full
 percentage points higher than an industry with no large plants. Given the
 magnitude of the fringe share in 1967 and 1977 (with means of
 approximately six and ten percent, respectively), this is a fairly noticeable
 effect.
 It is difficult to generalize on the quantitative impact of KLRATIO,
 given the instability of its coefficients across the equations of Table 2. It
 appears to be less important than either COMP or SIZE.
 The specifications of the equations in Table 2 imply that the quanti-
 tative impact of unionization will vary with the level of concentration and
 vice versa. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the effects of these
 variables jointly. The combined effects are illustrated in Tables 3 and 4,
 which show the results of using equations 2-1 and 2-3, respectively, of
 Table 2 to calculate the value of the fringe share for various levels of union
 coverage/membership and concentration, with other variables held constant
 at their mean values. In both tables, the results are approximately sym-
 metrical with respect to unionization and concentration. Rising unioni-
 zation appears to have a larger positive impact on the fringe share in high
 concentration industries that it does in low concentration industries, while
 the impact of rising concentration also appears to be greater when unioni-
 zation is high. Together, concentration and unionization appear to have an
 important impact.
 In 1967 (Table 3), an industry for which UNION and CONC are both 80
 percent would have a fringe share of .079, 55 percent higher than the share
 of .051 for an industry for which both variables are 20 percent. In 1977
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 TABLE 3
 Fringe Share for Various Levels
 of Union Coverage and Concentration. 1967
 Concentration Union Coverage (Percentage)
 Percentage
 20 40 60 80 100
 20 .051 .052 .054 .056 .058
 40 .052 .056 .060 .064 .067
 60 .054 .060 .066 .071 .077
 80 .055 .063 .071 .079 .087
 100 .057 .067 .077 .087 .097
 Source: Computed using Equation 2-1 of Table 2, assuming mean values for
 COMP, SIZE, and KLRATIO
 TABLE 4
 Fringe Share for Various Levels of Union Membership
 and Concentration, 1977
 Concentration Union Membership (Percentage)
 Percentage
 20 40 60 80 100
 20 .087 .094 .102 .109 .116
 40 .093 .102 .111 .120 .129
 60 .100 .111 .121 .132 .142
 80 .106 .119 .131 .143 .156
 100 .113 .127 .141 .155 .169
 Source: Computed using Equation 2-3 of Table 2, assuming mean values for
 COMP, SIZE, and KLRATIO
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 (Table 4), an industry for which UNION and CONC are both 80 percent
 would have a fringe share of .143, 64 percent higher than the share of .087
 for an industry for which both variables are 20 percent. Concentration and
 unionization appear to have strong effects on the fringe share in both 1967
 and 1977,10 although interactive effects are less pronounced in 1977.
 V. CONCLUSIONS
 Cross section regression results for a large sample of four digit
 manufacturing industries corroborate at the individual industry level earlier
 findings indicating that the share of fringe benefits in total compensation is
 affected positively by higher income and employer size. The results with
 turnover costs were mixed which may be due to the fact that capital inten-
 sity is not an ideal indicator of the importance of turnover costs. The most
 important finding is that unionization and concentration together produce
 strong, positive effects on the fringe share. This finding should be of some
 interest to policy makers in the fields of antitrust and taxation.
 This is only the second study to investigate the possible impact of
 product market power on the fringe share. Use of an alternative data set
 in regression analysis resulted in much higher coefficients of determination
 than were found in AlpertTs study. This apparently is due to the fact that
 the alternative data set allows for better data comparability among the
 variables employed, while also allowing for the empirical work to be
 carried out at the four digit level of aggregation . This suggests that these
 matters should be given greater consideration in future research.
 10It must be recognized that the 1967 and 1977 results are not
 precisely comparable, since the 1967 UNION measure is based on coverage,
 while the 1977 UNION measure is based on membership.
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